Cross-National Measures of Political Inequality of Voice by Dubrow, Joshua Kjerulf
Research & Methods 
ISSN 1234-9224 Vol. 19 (1, 2010): 93–110
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology
Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw
www.ifi span.waw.pl
e-mail: publish@ifi span.waw.pl
Cross-National Measures of Political Inequality 
of Voice*
Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow
Polish Academy of Sciences
Social scientists have long argued that political power is a key dimension of stratifi cation, 
yet few empirically analyze political inequality or explicitly discuss the methodological 
implications of their measures of it. Political inequality is a distinct dimension of social 
stratifi cation and a form of power inequality whose domain is all things related to political 
processes. It is a multidimensional concept – comprised of voice, response, and policy 
– that occurs in all types of governance structures. Conceptions of political inequality of 
voice refl ect the well-established fi nding that position within the social and political structure 
impacts individual and group political infl uence. I argue that defi nitions and measures of 
political inequality of voice should focus on the extent of infl uence given its connection, but 
not reduction, to economic resources. This article proposes and evaluates cross-national 
structural measures of political inequality of voice based on the relationship between 
socioeconomic status and political participation. I explore the relationships between the 
measures and the rankings of European countries using data from the European Social 
Survey 2008 and the Economist Intelligence Unit Index of Democracy 2008’s “political 
participation” category. 
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Social scientists have long argued that political power is a key dimension of 
stratifi cation (Weber 1946; Lenski 1966; Dahl 2006), yet few empirically analyze 
political inequality (Bartels 2008; Winters and Page 2009). Although attention to 
global inequality has increased, most examine income (Firebaugh 1999; Milanovic 
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2002; Neckerman and Torche 2007), some examine health (Goselin and Firebaugh 
2004; Mackenbach and Kunst 1997), and fewer still examine political infl uence 
(Anderson and Beramendi 2008). Most discussions of political inequality consist 
of philosophical debates over whether political equality is possible, or even 
necessary (Verba 2006; Bohman 1999; Dahl 2006; Ware 1981). The few empirical 
discussions neither explicitly discuss the methodological implications of their 
measures nor how they can be applied cross-nationally (Anderson and Beramendi 
2008; Teorell et al 2007; Winters and Page 2009). These defi ciencies in the social 
science literature constitute a huge gap in our knowledge of how modern societies 
work.
This article proposes and evaluates cross-national measures of political inequality. 
Because political power has many forms, I limit this article to the measures of 
inequality of citizen voice in the form of political participation, a fundamental 
means of infl uence in modern, Western democratic societies (Verba 2006: 504–5; 
Schlozman et al 2004). I explore the relationships between the measures and the 
rankings of European countries according to their level of political inequality of 
voice using the European Social Survey 2008 and the Economist Intelligence Unit 
Index of Democracy 2008. 
DEFINITIONS OF POLITICAL INEQUALITY 
Although much discussed, few explicitly defi ne political inequality. In all 
conceptualizations, no matter how vague, political inequality is a matter of who 
infl uences the decisions of decision-making bodies. At root, all conceptions refl ect 
the well-established fi nding that position within the social and political structures 
impacts individual and group political infl uence (Verba et al 1978; APSA 2004). 
Consider three defi nitions. One is by Sorokin (1959 [1927]): political inequality 
is the existence of authority divisions. This rather broad defi nition implies that 
political inequality is the existence of two or more groups with unequal political 
input into the decisions that affect them. If existence of authority divisions is the 
form political inequality takes, then the verticality of the authority structure, i.e the 
distance between the masses and the decision makers, is its magnitude: the more 
layers of authority between the citizen and the decision, the greater the political 
inequality. There are two main problems with operationalizing this defi nition. First, 
it assumes the theoretical existence of a situation that never was: a totally fl attened 
authority structure, i.e. no authority divisions whatsoever, where all groups would 
have equal say in legislation and policy. Second, to measure political inequality 
in this way, we would need to interpret and compare the organizational charts of 
political decision-making systems around the world, a daunting and potentially 
fruitless task.
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Another more workable defi nition is the political resource approach: 
political inequality is structured differences in the distribution and acquisition 
of political resources. In this defi nition, political resources are like economic 
resources, complete with measureable boundaries in which one group has more 
or less of these resources than another group (see also Ware 1981: 393). The 
political resources approach is refl ected in the 1996 APSA presidential address, 
in which Lijphart warned that “unequal participation spells unequal infl uence ... 
the inequality in representation and infl uence are not randomly distributed but 
systematically biased in favor of more privileged citizens” (1997: 1) [emphasis 
added]. 
While at times “political resources” is a useful simplifying analogy, in terms 
of measurement this approach is problematic. A political resource is potentially 
anything in a political situation that could infl uence a decision: it can be a social 
thing – material, ideational, a personal attribute, a group level attribute, an authority 
position, a network connection – or an action, such as political participation (Dahl 
1996; Yamokoski and Dubrow 2008; Piven and Cloward 2005). If anything can 
be used as a political resource, it is problematic to fi nd a measure of political 
resources ready-for-use in all contexts and has a functionally equivalent meaning 
across nations. From this criticism we can understand Dahl’s (2006) argument 
that a cross-national measure of political inequality is impossible to obtain: “…to 
estimate gains and losses in political equality we lack cardinal measures that would 
allow us to say, for example, that “political equality is twice as great in country 
X as in country Y.” At best we must rely on ordinal measures based on judgments 
about ‘more,’ ‘less,’ ‘about the same,’ and the like” (78). This is based on the 
assumption that political inequality is a distributive problem1. 
Another defi nition is adapted from Piven and Cloward’s (2005) interdependency 
approach to power relations: political inequality is the extent to which groups within 
society differ in their infl uence over government decisions.  In the interdependency 
approach, political infl uence is found in the range of actions an actor can take 
within a political interaction. Actions used to infl uence governments are context 
dependent: they must be appropriate to the task at hand and characteristics of 
the relationship between the interacting groups reveal possible (political power) 
actions. Piven and Cloward’s point is that even those perceived as powerless 
actually have great potential for political infl uence: “from this perspective, power 
resources are the attributes or things that one actor can use to coerce or induce 
another actor… almost everyone has something that can be used to infl uence 
somebody” (Piven and Cloward 2005: 37). For example, in communist-era Poland, 
political connections were more formidable resources than money in infl uencing 
political offi cials. The protest tactics of the non-violent Solidarity movement was 
able to infl uence government decisions in a way that an assault with weapons 
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could not. Unlike Sorokin’s defi nition and the resource approach, here groups are 
defi ned by their extent and potential of political infl uence. 
The power interdependency approach reveals another problem with the 
resources analogy: “resources” presupposes a distributional mechanism external 
to the individual or group within the interaction. Troublesome questions arise: 
Who distributes these resources? Are they distributed in the same manner across 
all political interactions? In the power interdependency approach, “resources” 
are replaced with “potential actions,” side-stepping the problem of assuming 
a hypothetical cache of “political resources” and an external distributional 
mechanism. In sum, defi nitions of political inequality should focus on the extent 
of potential infl uence without the constraints the resource analogy presents. 
PREVIOUS MEASURES OF POLITICAL INEQUALITY
To construct measures of political inequality, the 2004 American Political Science 
Association Task Force on Inequality and American Democracy is a good starting 
point. In their 2004 report, “American Democracy in an Age of Rising Inequality,” 
the APSA Task Force identifi ed three foci of political inequality: citizen voice, 
government responsiveness, and patterns of public policy making. The upshot 
is that the disadvantaged are lesser represented and lesser involved in political 
participation, government offi cials are less inclined to be responsive to the 
preferences of the disadvantaged, and public policy often fails to address the needs 
of the disadvantaged. 
Extrapolating from their study, I identify political inequality as a distinct 
dimension of social stratifi cation and a form of power inequality whose domain is 
all things related to political processes. It is a multidimensional concept – comprised 
of voice, response, and policy – that occurs in all types of governance structures, 
from social movement organizations, to local councils, to national governments, 
and to global governance. A fl exible concept of political inequality can be applied 
across nations and across time and across all types of political decision-making 
systems (Dubrow 2008).
Previous empirical studies have measured political inequality in three different 
ways, each with shortcomings. The fi rst is in terms of social concentrations 
occupying strategic political positions where some groups are on the winning side 
of political competitions more often than others. This “concentrations” conception 
of political inequality has been measured as concentration of power (Acemoglu 
et al 2007) and descriptive representation, i.e. the extent to which the parliament 
resembles the demographic and experiential diversity of the citizenry (Griffi n and 
Keane 2006). There are two problems. First, political concentration measures 
underestimate the degree of infl uence ordinary citizens have in political interactions 
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(Piven and Cloward 2005). Second, descriptive representation measures in and 
of themselves fail to account for whether descriptive representatives are actually 
concerned with acting in accordance with their role (Dubrow 2010). 
The second is in terms of efforts individuals and groups make to achieve 
political decisions favorable to them. Previous “efforts” measures include 
psychological engagement with politics (Solt 2008) and voter turnout (Anderson 
and Beramendi 2008). This, too, has problems. Psychological engagement such 
as knowledge and attitudes toward politics are preconditions for political action, 
but attitudinal measures are not substitutes for measures of citizen behavior. Voter 
turnout is an important aspect, but there are four problems with using it in and of 
itself as a measure of political inequality. First, infl uence of voting on government 
decisions depends on the choices offered in the political market: If voters are 
faced with parties and candidates who do not share their interests, then voting 
itself will not make change. Second, voter turnout assumes that all people vote. 
In reality, the advantaged tend to vote more than the disadvantaged. Third, those 
who cannot vote, i.e. the disenfranchised, are not accounted for. Fourth, voting is 
often over-reported in surveys, making them unreliable guides for the extent of 
citizen engagement and over-estimating the degree of political equality in citizen 
voice. 
The third type is an accounting of which groups tend to have more political 
decisions that are favorable to them. “Outcomes” measures are rare. Bartels’ 
(2008) study of public opinion and roll-call voting that suggests that government 
is more responsive to higher level income groups is remarkable in this regard (see 
also Gilens 2005). While outcome measures are potentially the best, complexity 
in policy outcomes can be hard to handle; who the winning group(s) are in policy 
decisions is often not clear, forcing some contestable decisions on the part of the 
researcher. 
These previous attempts highlight two key problems in measuring political 
inequality2. The fi rst is how to measure infl uence. Political infl uence is notoriously 
diffi cult to measure as it is an interaction process that is more inferred from 
conditions, efforts and outcomes than directly observed (see Dahl 2006: Chapter 6). 
The second is that inequality must be understood as the distance between two 
groups, i.e. “to distinguish perfect equality from a state of inequality” (Allison 
1979: 865). A comparison to income inequality is useful, here. Income inequality 
is often measured by the distance between those with more income and those with 
less. In contrast, political inequality is the distance between those with a lot of 
potential infl uence and those with less. Unlike income, we do not actually see 
what is measured, and we can only infer it from its outcome. In cross-national 
perspective, this is further complicated by needing a measure that is functionally 
equivalent across nations. 
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In this article, I explore political inequality of a particular type, that being 
citizen voice in terms of conventional political participation. Conventional 
political participation refers here to the lawful activities citizens do to infl uence 
government decisions in legislation and policy. Political participation arose out of 
the relationship between state and masses, where masses attempt to be heard from 
outside the decision-making chambers occupied by the elite. 
Measures of political inequality in Europe should account for how political 
inequality of voice functions in modern democracies, that is, political inequality 
is rooted in the connection between socioeconomic resources and political 
participation. Classic and contemporary theories suggest that political infl uence 
is intertwined with economic privilege (Lenski 1966; Weber 1946). Weber argued 
that political power stemmed from the organization of interests into parties. 
This political organizational aspect of social life called “parties” consists of 
class or status situations, and thus products of the economic and social orders, 
respectively. As party composition is determined by the structure of domination 
within the community, in modern capitalist societies, where the economic 
situation is dominant, parties are intimately connected to the economic order. 
Borrowing from Weber, Lenski (1966: 318) argued that political regimes infl uence 
the distribution of scarce and valued resources, and modern industrial society 
has lower inequality because democracy distributes power more equitably. In 
market societies, according to Lenski, political power is a function of wealth 
(229). Lenski’s point is echoed in the most consistent fi nding in the political 
participation literature: the economically advantaged, more privileged members 
of society tend to participate more than the disadvantaged (Verba et al 1978; 
see also Gallego 2008). Thus, in Europe conventional political participation 
and economic resources can be combined to form a valid measure of political 
infl uence. It is expected that countries differ in the way they combine political 
with socioeconomic resources, with some countries having a stronger economic 
tie to political participation than others.
Some assert the primacy of economic resources over political ones, reducing 
political inequality to economic inequality (Winters and Page 2008). For the 
purposes of cross-national measurement, we should limit “resources” to that which 
is mainly political, with the understanding that some resources – such as economic 
ones – are integral to the formation of political inequality in certain historical and 
contextual situations. In sum, structural measures of political inequality of voice 
in modern democracies must refl ect the extent of inequality given its connection, 
but not reduction, to economic resources. 
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DATA, MEASURES AND METHODS
The purpose of the empirical evaluation is to interrogate the theoretical and 
methodological underpinnings of the political inequality measures.
Data
I constructed a country-level dataset in which each country has variables that 
represent measures of political inequality of voice. My base is Round Four of 
the European Social Survey (ESS 2008). ESS is a cross-sectional, cross-national 
dataset with individuals as the units of analysis. My sample size consists of 25 
countries inside or adjacent to the European continent (with the exception of Israel). 
Appendix A presents the variables’ distribution across the included countries.
Measures of Political Inequality
The Achilles Heel of political participation-based studies is that substantive 
conclusions depend in large part on the political participation items the researcher 
selects3. Choosing cross-national measures of political participation is usually 
based on (1) a construct of political participation that is country invariant (using 
variations of data reduction techniques such as factor-analysis) (e.g. Teorell et 
al 2007), (2) country-specifi c political participation types, and (3) all available 
types. 
ESS has a wide range of political participation types. The battery of political 
participation items reads:
“There are different ways of trying to improve things in [name of a country] 
or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have 
you done any of the following? Have you:
(a) contacted a politician, government or local government offi cial? 
(b) worked in a political party or action group?
(c) worked in another organization or association?
(d) worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker?
(e) signed a petition?
(f) taken part in a lawful public demonstration?
(g) boycotted certain products?”
To measure conventional political participation, I used all political 
participation items in ESS 2008 except voting; I classify a case as representing 
political participation if the respondent pro vided a positive answer to at least one 
of the items. I argue that idiosyncratic national patterns of the indicators under 
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consideration should be treated as alternative expressions of political participation 
rather than cumulative ones that measure the intensity of the underlying common 
phenomenon. I have two reasons for this argument. First, the meaning of the 
participation indicators could be country-specifi c (for a general argument, see 
Tilly 2006). Second, number of total different political actions would wrongly 
suggest a reliable measure of the effect of those actions on a political outcome. 
Imagine a situation in which one person performs all political actions included in 
ESS, and another who did just one. The one-type actor may be more politically 
powerful depending on how many times they performed that one action and the 
action’s effect on a political decision. Thus, for each country I created a dichotomy, 
dividing all respondents into those who participated in any of forms and the rest. 
As I am concerned with structural political inequality, I created two measures 
that explicitly link political participation with socioeconomic status. The fi rst 
is the ratio of high to low SES quintiles with regard to the percentage of those 
who engaged in at least one form of political participation. I measure SES as a 
combination of household income, international socioeconomic index (ISEI) score, 
and years of education4. I conducted a factor analysis of these three components 
for each country separately. Next, I calculated quintiles for each country. Ratio is 
interpreted as the following: the greater the score, the greater the political inequality 
of voice between high and low SES quintiles. 
The second measure is an index of dissimilarity, where the higher the score, 
the greater the political inequality. Index of dissimilarity was calculated for each 
country separately using the following equation:
(1) Index of Dissimilarity = 0,5 ( ∑ |pij – eij|)
Where p is the predicted value, e is the expected value (in this case, proportion 
of 0,20), i is the quintile, and j is the country. 
Each measure addresses a different question regarding the structural nature of 
political inequality of voice. Ratio of high to low quintiles measures the extremity of 
political inequality. The question the ratio addresses is, what is the extent of political 
voice inequality between the most advantaged and the most desadvantaged? The 
advantage of the index of dissimilarity is that it takes into account the entire range 
of SES quintiles, and thus can address a broader question: what is the extent of 
political voice inequality across the entire social structure? If we consider country 
differences in political participation, we would rephrase the question as: given the 
distribution of political participation across SES quintiles, and given the overall 
level of political participation, what percentage of political participators would 
have to change SES quintiles to achieve perfect political equality of voice? Note 
that these structural measures are highly sensitive to country-specifi c relationships 
between SES and political participation. 
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Finally, it would be useful to compare these measures of political inequality 
of voice with another well-known measure. To this end, I examine the Economist 
Intelligence Unit Index of Democracy 2008 (EIU). EIU is the average of fi ve 
categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of 
government; political participation; and political culture. I focus on their measure 
of “political participation” which ranges from 0 to 10, where the higher the score, 
the greater the political participation. In the context of this study, lower scores 
indicate greater political inequality of voice. See Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
Index of Democracy 2008 (pp. 24 – 26) for its constituent items.
While an intriguing cross-national measure that includes over a hundred 
different countries, EIU’s political participation measure is problematic for 
a number of reasons. First, EIU does not present information on the extent to 
which its constituent items statistically fi t together. Second, it confl ates political 
participation with political representation (specifi cally, it includes percent women 
in parliament), two analytically distinct concepts. Third, it includes “adult literacy” 
which is not an inherently political concept. Fourth, items such as whether “ethnic, 
religious and other minorities have a reasonable degree of autonomy and voice in 
the political process” and whether “the authorities make a serious effort to promote 
political participation” are not clear: what is “reasonable autonomy?” Who are 
“the authorities,” and what is meant by “serious effort?” Fifth, considering the 
source of the study – The Economist – it is strange that it does not account at all 
for economic resources.  
Relationships between the Measures 
The fi rst thing to note is that, for the masses, political voice is more whisper 
than shout: people tend not to engage in basic forms of political participation5 
(see Appendix A). The median is 31 percent, ranging from Sweden’s high of 69 
percent to Turkey’s low of 13 percent. To account for country differences in this 
regard, I weighted the index of dissimilarity by the proportion of overall political 
participation.
Table 1 presents bivariate correlations of the relationships between these three 
measures plus the overall percentage of political participation. Three fi ndings 
should be noted. First, all measures are statistically related (p < 0,05). Second, 
the index of dissimilarity and the ratio measures are very highly correlated (0,95). 
Third, EIU is only moderately correlated with the structural measures based on 
ESS. 
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Table 1 Correlation Matrix of Measures of Political Inequality of Voice
  I II III IV
I Percent Political Participation –
II Ratio of High to Low SES Quintiles -0,59 –
III Index of Dissimilarity -0,74  0,95 –
IV EIU Political Participation (2008)  0,70 -0,49 -0,55 –
Note: All correlations are statistically signifi cant at the 0,05 level or below.
The use of creating a cross-national measure is in comparative research. 
Figures 1 and 2 rank each country according to their score on the weighted index 
of dissimilarity and ratio of low to high SES quintiles, respectively.
Figure 1 Political Inequality of Voice by Country Based on Weighted Index of Dis-
similarity
Note: Post-communist countries are in gray.
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Figure 2 Political Inequality of Voice by Country Based on Ratio of High to Low SES 
Quintiles 
Note: Post-communist countries are in gray.
There are several aspects of note. First, It is striking that the median political 
inequality of voice score is 0,56 for the weighted index of dissimilarity and 
2,74 for the ratio, both of which are rather low. While the aim of this paper is 
to conceptualize and measure political inequality of voice, these relatively low 
scores require at least some explanation. The overall low level of inequality 
may be explained by the relative homogeneity of European countries in terms 
of the rights to politically participate. As a test of this assumption, I examined 
the relationship between democracy – measured by the EIU democracy score – 
and the index of dissimilarity (r = -0,54, p < 0,05). As expected, most European 
countries cluster in the high democracy, low political voice inequality quadrant 
of Figure 3, with democratically challenged countries of the Russian Federation 
and Turkey clearly apart. Of Russia and Turkey, only Turkey has a clearly high 
level of political inequality. Both Russia and Ukraine present curious cases, as one 
would not expect such low political inequality of voice in the midst of struggling 
democracies. One should note that in these countries far less than 20 percent of the 
population report that they politically participate, a very low score considering the 
company they keep: Finland has 66 percent, Denmark has 62 percent, and France 
has 56 percent, each some three times the level of political participation. 
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Figure 3 Relationship between Democracy and Political Inequality of Voice
Note: Post-communist countries are in gray.
Second, there may be a regional effect, as Northern European countries tend 
to have the lowest levels of political inequality while post-communist Central and 
Eastern European countries have the highest. No other regional effects are clearly 
evident. 
Third, these fi gures highlight the outliers of Poland and Portugal, who have 
relatively high political inequality yet formally possess all the rights of their 
fellow European democracies. Here the structural nature of the political inequality 
measure may drive the result. It can be surmised that in these countries, with 
post-communist countries of Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and Slovenia not 
far behind, socioeconomic status has a rather tight grip on political participation. 
SUMMARY
Although political inequality is often discussed in the social sciences, few attempted 
to systematically defi ne, measure, and determine the extent of it. In this article 
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I presented various defi nitions and measures of political inequality, focusing on 
voice inequality. Because this study focuses on European countries, I constructed 
measures that accounts for, but does not reduce to, economic resources. Specifi cally, 
I measured structural political inequality of voice of political participation. As was 
the point of the article, I discussed each decision in the process of conceptualization 
and measurement. Empirical results reveal that, on average, political inequality in 
Europe is rather low, owing much to the similarly high levels of democracy across 
the nations studied.
DISCUSSION
Political inequality bridges sociology and political science, political sociology 
and social stratifi cation. The challenge of the fi eld of political inequality is to 
unite the vast knowledge we have about social stratifi cation – its theories, its 
empirical research, its methodology – with the vast knowledge we have about 
politics found in political science and political sociology. In essence, the challenge 
is to take what is currently fragmented and multidisciplinary and build a coherent 
interdisciplinary knowledge of concepts, measures, causes and consequences of 
political inequality.
While there are many clear defi nitions and well-established measures of other 
major types of inequality – e.g. economic and educational inequalities – that enable 
researchers to address basic empirical questions of, “how unequal is society?” and 
“what are the causes and consequences of this inequality?” there are few attempts 
to directly measure political inequality. As a result, the following key questions 
remain unaddressed: 
(1) How do we defi ne and measure political inequality, within and between 
nations?
(2) How does political inequality differ from democracy and the quality of 
democracy?
(3) How does political inequality interact with other inequalities: economic, 
gender, racial and ethnic, educational, health and others?
(4) How politically unequal are modern democracies?
(5) What causes political inequality?
(6) What are the consequences of political inequality for individuals, societies 
and social structures?
Critical to answering these questions are developing cross-national measures of 
all types of political inequality. To do this, as Sorokin (1959 [1927]) suggested, we 
must fi rst recognize that political inequality is a distinct dimension of stratifi cation. 
This means that in theory or in operationalization of its concepts, political 
inequality cannot be reduced to economic, status, gender, race and ethnic, or class 
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inequalities.  Empirical research should treat political inequality as an analytically 
distinct form of stratifi cation.  For example, instead of assuming that economic 
resources equal political resources, we should try to understand the extent to which 
they are separate, and in what contexts their differences and similarities are most 
prominent. In sum, the way we approach economic inequality, or status inequality, 
should be the same way we approach political inequality.  
NOTES
1  Dahl (1996) defi nes political resources as “almost anything” – including money, 
reputation, legal status, social capital and knowledge, to name a few – that has value and 
can be used to achieve political ends. 
2  A criticism that applies to all previous measurement attempts is that political inequality 
is not precisely defi ned: most are measuring political inequality of voice, and others, like 
Bartels (2008), are measuring political inequality in terms of government responsiveness. 
These are separate dimensions of political inequality that should not be confused with 
political inequality as a whole.
3  Because few studies of political inequality critically examine the impact of their measures 
on their substantive conclusions, it is important to note that operationalizing political 
inequality requires a series of methodological decisions – which political participation 
items to use, the measures of economic resources, not to mention dataset choice – each 
of which infl uences the variation in the variable and the ranking of the countries. What 
I present is not a defi nitive operationalization; rather, it should be seen as the product 
of the various decisions I made given my theoretical construct. As with measures of 
economic inequality, I encourage debate as to which series of measurement decisions 
capture the “true” state of political inequality of voice for a given country.
4  ISEI is a combination of income and level of education attached to occupation (so-called 
ISCO, or international standardized classifi cation of occupation) scores, where the higher 
the number, the greater the ISEI (see Ganzeboom et al 1992).
5  A simple percentage of political participation does not meet the basic requirements of 
measures of inequality, i.e. the measurable distance between groups, and thus is not an 
empirical focus. 
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APPENDIX A. VARIABLES’ DISTRIBUTION
Country 
Political 
Participation 
(%)
Ratio of High 
to Low SES 
Quintiles
Index of 
Dissimilarity
Weighted 
Index of 
Dissimilarity
Political 
Participation: EIU
Belgium   48,75 1,96 0,10 0,21 6,11
Croatia   33,42 3,39 0,16 0,47 6,11
Czech Republic  31,42 2,10 0,09 0,28 6,67
Denmark   62,61 1,85 0,08 0,13 8,89
Estonia   23,24 3,00 0,15 0,64 5,0
Finland   66,38 1,56 0,06 0,09 7,78
France   56,01 1,87 0,09 0,16 6,67
Germany   58,49 2,02 0,11 0,18 7,78
Greece   25,58 2,73 0,14 0,56 6,67
Hungary   19,04 3,68 0,17 0,90 5,56
Israel   18,88 2,43 0,15 0,77 8,33
Latvia   22,73 3,00 0,16 0,70 6,11
Netherlands  46,01 2,23 0,11 0,25 9,44
Norway   68,37 1,33 0,04 0,06 10,0
Poland   18,10 5,11 0,26 1,46 6,11
Portugal   14,45 7,38 0,29 1,99 5,56
Romania   17,57 2,32 0,11 0,64 6,11
Russian Federation 16,96 1,94 0,10 0,59 5,56
Slovenia   21,62 3,72 0,17 0,80 6,67
Spain   33,00 2,67 0,14 0,41 6,67
Sweden   69,73 1,36 0,05 0,07 10,0
Switzerland  53,49 1,71 0,10 0,19 7,78
Turkey   12,96 6,38 0,26 1,98 4,44
Ukraine   17,99 0,87 0,06 0,36 5,56
United Kingdom  52,72 1,90 0,10 0,19 5,0
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